The Impact of Tariff Diversity on Broadband Diffusion – An Empirical Analysis

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Abstract

This paper provides an empirical analysis how tariff diversity affects fixed-line broadband uptake, utilizing a new data set with 1497 fixed-line and 2158 mobile broadband tariffs from 91 countries across the globe. An instrumental variable approach is applied to estimate demand, controlling for various industry and socio-economic factors. The empirical results indicate that, firstly, lower prices, more tariff diversity and higher income increase broadband penetration. Secondly, inter-platform competition and mobile broadband prices are not found to have a significant effect on fixed-line broadband penetration. This suggests that low prices and the diversity of broadband offerings are more important drivers of fixed broadband adoption than competition between various technologies (cable networks, fixed-line telephone networks, mobile networks).

JEL Classification numbers: L86, L96.

Keywords: Broadband prices; Tariff diversity; Broadband demand; Broadband penetration, Broadband uptake; Price discrimination; Inter-platform competition

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1 Introduction

Around the globe, policy makers see broadband penetration as a key driver for economic growth (see, e.g. OECD 2008). Broadband directly or indirectly spurs innovation, productivity, and, thereby, a country’s national competitiveness. Therefore, the number of high-speed Internet connections has become an important indicator for a country’s growth potential (e.g. Crandall, Hahn & Tardiff 2002, OECD 2003, ITU 2003, ITU 2006). A timely deployment and uptake of broadband infrastructure has, therefore, become a major policy objective for many governments.

In fact, the perspective that broadband infrastructure deployment has positive effects on growth is also supported by empirical evidence. Ever since the by now seminal study of Röller & Waverman (2001) found that telecommunications infrastructure is one of the key drivers of economic growth, many other studies have come to very similar findings, demonstrating the robustness of Röller & Waverman’s empirical findings across time as well as across countries and regions. Koutroumpis (2009), for example, has analyzed the impact of broadband penetration on countries’ GDP and found that a 10% increase in broadband coverage results in an increased growth rate of 0.25% for OECD member states. Qiang, Rossotto & Kimura (2009) have suggested that the effect of increased broadband penetration is even larger: According to this study, each additional percentage point of broadband penetration results in a 0.121% increase in the GDP growth rate in high-income countries and even 0.138% in low- and middle-income countries. More recently, the prominent study by Czernich, Falck, Kretschmer & Woessmann (2011) has found that a 10% increase in broadband penetration has even raised annual per capita growth by 0.9-1.5% between 1996-2007 in 25 OECD member states. Further studies that demonstrate how broadband penetration positively affects economic growth include Pradhan, Bele & Pandey (2013), Sassi & Goaied (2013), Jung, Na & Yoon (2013), Chavula (2013), Lee, Levendis & Gutierrez (2012), Gruber & Koutroumpis (2011), Thompson & Garbacz (2011), Shiu & Lam (2008), and Lam & Shiu (2010). The empirical literature on the impact of broadband on individual firms’ productivity, which induces the macroeconomic growth effects in the end, has been nicely summarized in more detail by Cardona, Kretschmer & Strobel (2013).

As a natural consequence, broadband policy now has a prominent role on many government agendas (see, e.g., ITU & UNESCO 2013). In Europe, Asia and North America substantial efforts have been undertaken to foster the diffusion of broadband infrastructure, access, and services. In Europe, for example, various action plans that aim at making the European Union the “most competitive and dynamic knowledge based economy” (European Council 2000) have been launched over the
last decade. More recently, the US government’s National Broadband Plan and the European Commission’s Digital Agenda for Europe focus on extending internet connectivity and on reducing prices for broadband access. Given that Europe is still lagging behind its main Asian competitors as well as the US (see, e.g., Briglauer & Gugler 2013), the European Commission’s “Europe 2020 Strategy” has outlined a number of objectives to ensure that “by 2020, (i) all Europeans have access to much higher internet speeds of above 30 Mbps and [that] (ii) 50% or more of European households subscribe to internet connections above 100 Mbps” (European Commission 2010, p. 20).

Given these ambitious objectives, there has been considerable interest in understanding the key factors that drive broadband diffusion. A growing body of empirical literature, which will be reviewed in more detail in section 2 of this paper, has been analyzing what affects broadband deployment and uptake either at a single-country or at a cross-country level, in order to single out the factors that drive broadband penetration. In short, most papers have focused on (a) broadband price levels, (b) income, (c) socio-demographic characteristics, (d) Government policy and regulation, and (e) the degree of inter- and intra-platform competition. This paper will also take these factors into account, but in addition to previous studies the present analysis also accounts for the degree of tariff diversity. To the authors’ knowledge the focus on tariff diversity is new and, hence, one of the main novelties of this paper. While it is rather clear that price levels should have an impact on broadband uptake, it is, however, for a theoretical perspective less clear ex ante how tariff diversity should affect broadband penetration. On the one hand, classical industrial economics theory suggests that price discrimination in final consumer markets should lead to an expansion of output (i.e., increased broadband penetration in the case at hand), as it allows suppliers to serve low-value customers without lowering the price for high-value customers at the same time. Moreover, price discrimination can be used by firms to make consumer, who are willing to switch to another operator, stay with their initial internet provider. Esteves (2014) shows that with behavior- based price discrimination final consumer prices can be reduced which should ultimately result in increased demand. On the other hand, however, accounting for more recent theories of boundedly rational consumer behavior the prediction becomes less clear. As e.g. Spiegler (2006) has argued, consumers may become confused over “too much variety” or “too many tariffs”. In fact, there has been a burgeoning literature which demonstrates that consumer decisions are prone to mistakes in telecommunications markets (see, e.g., Bolle & Heimel 2005, Lambrecht & Skiera 2006, Haucap & Heimeshoff 2011). Based on these findings, Eliaz
& Spiegler (2006), Brown, Hossain & Morgan (2010), Piccione & Spiegler (2012), and Herweg & Mierendorff (2013) have developed models which suggest that firms may sometimes deliberately choose to obfuscate consumers in order to increase their profits. As a consequence, consumers may become frustrated and more reluctant to sign a contract. In fact, the success of (simple) flat-rate tariffs in telecommunications markets may suggest that simple tariffs may be more helpful in fostering penetration than more diverse and complicated offerings. From a theoretical perspective it is, therefore, not entirely clear how tariff diversity affects broadband uptake: While classical industrial economic theory would suggest a positive relationship between tariff diversity (as a measure for price discrimination) and broadband uptake, the more recently advanced behavioral economics view may suggest a negative one (seeing tariff diversity as a measure for customer obfuscation strategies).

The purpose of this paper is to provide an empirical assessment for how tariff diversity influences broadband uptake, while accounting for other factors that affect broadband penetration such as price levels, income, demographic factors, and public policy. The analysis accounts for two main dimensions of fixed-line broadband offerings, namely speed and price. To make price levels across different speed levels comparable tariffs are standardized by the offered download speed so that tariffs are expressed in the price per Megabit per second (Mbps). In addition, other tariff characteristics may further differentiate the service and affect "quality" such as the underlying technology, network stability, or service offers. The characteristics are unfortunately not directly observable or quantifiable for the authors, even though they may potentially affect consumers' willingness to pay and, therefore, equilibrium prices.

The empirical analysis is based on a newly available data set that includes around 1500 broadband-only-offers (without any further bundled services) from 91 countries for the third quarter of 2012. Hence, the second major novelty of this paper is, apart from its research focus on tariff variety, the use of an entirely new data set. For the econometric analysis, an instrumental variable approach is used to estimate the demand for fixed-line broadband internet access, controlling for industry-specific and socio-economic effects. As expected, the empirical analysis reveals that lower prices and higher income, alternatively OECD membership, foster broadband uptake. In addition, an increase in tariff diversity provides a further impetus for broadband penetration, supporting the classical perspective that price discrimination induces output expansion. Beyond these effects, neither inter-platform competition (cable

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1 Under the category "fixed-line broadband" all fixed-line technologies are subsumed, i.e., are xDSL, Cable, Fibre, Satellite, and fixed wireless.
vs. telephone networks) nor mobile broadband prices have any direct additional
influence on broadband penetration.

The remainder of the paper is now organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the
relevant academic literature, before section 3 introduces the underlying data, the
estimation strategy employed and the empirical results. Section 4 finally discusses
the findings and concludes.

2 Literature Review

There is a steadily growing body of literature on drivers and impacts of broad-
band penetration. Two approaches have been used to address the issue: Firstly,
a mostly descriptive approach which aims at identifying drivers for broadband up-
take through a largely qualitative analysis (OECD 2001, Wu 2004) and, secondly,
empirical analyses based on econometric models that estimate broadband demand,
thereby explaining observed differences. The number of these empirical papers on
broadband deployment, uptake, and policy has grown quite noticeably most recently.
The studies have examined various economic, demographic, geographic, and policy
variables which may plausibly explain cross-country differences in broadband pen-
etration (see, e.g., Kim, Bauer & Wildman 2003, Garcia-Murillo 2005, Distaso, Lupi
Wu 2013). The key findings of these studies will be briefly discussed below.

Price: Several studies have stressed that the broadband price level is a signifi-
cant factor in determining broadband demand in any given country. Among these
studies are, for example, Distaso et al. (2006), Cava-Ferrander & Alabau-Muñoz
(2006), Denni & Gruber (2007), Wallsten & Hausladen (2009), Bouckaert, van Dijk
& Verboven (2010), Lee et al. (2011), and Briglauer (2014) to name just a few. To
provide an example, Galperin & Ruzzier (2013) have recently shown in their study
of broadband in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) that broadband demand
may actually be quite elastic. According to Galperin & Ruzzier an average price
reduction of 10% results in an increase in broadband demand of almost 22% in the
penetration rate in LAC, equivalent to almost 8.5 million additional broadband con-
nnections. In addition, Lin & Wu (2013) have shown in their analysis of broadband
adoption in the OECD from from 1997 to 2009 that broadband price levels have
been especially important for late adopters. Overall, the empirical evidence that
low price levels foster broadband penetration is overwhelming.
income: Nearly all of the studies referred to above also include income levels in their analysis and nearly all of them find, somewhat unsurprisingly, that income (GDP per capita) is a driving factor for fixed broadband demand. For example, Gruber & Koutroumpis (2013) have clearly found a positive and significant impact of income on broadband demand in both their panel data analysis of 30 OECD countries from 1999 to 2003 as well as in their panel data analysis of 167 countries from 2000 to 2010, respectively. In a more detailed study of the broadband diffusion process, Lin & Wu (2013) have shown that disposable household income is especially of importance for broadband adoption in the early adoption phase. In general, income has been identified as an important factor for broadband adoption across OECD countries.

competition: competition for broadband customers can basically take two forms: (i) service-based competition over the same infrastructure through open access provisions at various network layers, referred to as intra-platform competition, and (ii) facility-based competition between different technological platforms that can be used to provide broadband access, referred to as inter-platform competition. Generally speaking, the vast majority of studies has found that especially inter-platform competition has positive effects on broadband diffusion (see, e.g., Cava-Ferreruela & Alabau-Muñoz 2006, Distaso et al. 2006, Höfler 2007, Denni & Gruber 2007, Bouckaert et al. 2010, Nardotto, Valletti & Verboven 2013). Quite recent studies have, however, also produced different findings: Briglauer, Ecker & Gugler (2013) as well as Briglauer (2014) have found a non-linear relationship between inter-network competition and broadband diffusion, while both Calzada & Martínez-Santos (2014) and Gruber & Koutroumpis (2013) have found no evidence for inter-platform competition accelerating broadband diffusion. With respect to intra-platform competition, the results differ even more: While Lee et al. (2011) have found unbundling and service-based competition to foster broadband uptake, Denni & Gruber (2007), Distaso et al. (2006), Cava-Ferreruela & Alabau-Muñoz (2006), and Höfler (2007) found only small or insignificant effects. Moreover, Wallsten & Hausladen (2009), Bouckaert et al. (2010), and Briglauer et al. (2013) have even found that facilitating intra-network competition through access regulation negatively affects broadband penetration as it reduces incentives for broadband investment. Hence, the overall findings with respect to intra-platform competition are completely mixed, while inter-platform competition appears, by and large, to spur broadband penetration if a significant effect can be found.

In addition to these three factors (price levels, income, competition) a number of other variables have been examined in the literature such as demographic fac-
tors (e.g., age, education, and population density) or network characteristics such as the broadband speed available. Lee & Brown (2008), for example, have found that broadband speed and bandwidth (measured as bits per inhabitant), contribute to broadband adoption in OECD countries. Lin & Wu (2013) find that, apart from price levels and income, content and education are the main driving forces in the first (early adoption) stage. Trkman et al. (2008) suggest that education and population density are influential demographic factors of fixed broadband deployment in European Union countries. Cava-Ferreruela & Alabau-Muñoz (2006) argue that the "predisposition" to use new technologies appears to be a key driver for broadband supply and demand.

All of these studies have significantly contributed to a deeper understanding of the determinants of fixed broadband adoption. However, to the best of the authors’ knowledge not a single study has accounted for the extent of price differentiation so far. This study now contributes to the existing literature by adding tariff diversity as another potential factor to determine broadband demand.

3 Empirical Analysis

3.1 Data and Econometric Specification

The empirical analysis is based on a newly available data set that includes around 1500 broadband-only-offers (without any further bundled services) from 91 countries for the third quarter of 2012. The data on broadband tariffs is provided by Google and was gathered by visiting operator websites in the course of July 2012. All tariffs are aggregated on a country-level and prices are converted from local currency into US dollars, using purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates, which are taken from World Bank for the year 2011. Data for social, economic, and demographic indicators was gained from World Bank as well as ITU World Telecommunication Indicators Database. Out of 91 included countries 26 are OECD members and 65 are OECD non-member states.

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2 Lee & Brown (2008) use two different data sets provided by the OECD and the ITU covering different time spans, from 1999-2006 and 2002-2006, respectively.
3 Bundled services could be voice telephony, pay TV, mobile services and so on. If a broadband-only offer was not available, tariff offers of broadband combined with voice telephony were captured. Triple play offers (broadband+voice+TV) were excluded entirely.
4 The full data set is available under: http://policybythenumbers.blogspot.de/2012/08/international-broadband-pricing-study.html
5 For Iran, Libya, Syria and Taiwan no data was available for 2011, therefore the latest information from 2009 was implemented.
6 Table states all included countries in this study.
3.1.1 Prices

Price levels
According to economic theory of a downward sloping demand curve (for ordinary goods and services), a negative impact of price on broadband diffusion is expected. The price variable is measured by a tariff’s monthly charge. Since fixed-line broadband tariffs are differentiated with respect to speed and price, we standardize them by their advertised download speed, thus a fixed-line broadband tariff’s price is measured by monthly charge (in US$ PPP) per Mbps. The prices are aggregated on a country-level by calculating the average of all tariffs offered in a country. To reduce the impact of outliers the upper and lower two percent of all offers are excluded.

![Figure 1: Relationship between price and fixed broadband subscribers](image)

As illustrated by Figure 1 there is a negative relationship between price and diffusion rate. Hence, countries with higher broadband coverage are characterized by lower prices, maybe as suggested by ITU (2003) as a result of flourishing competition and innovative pricing schemes to attract a wide variety of customers.

The price for mobile broadband price is also included in the analysis. It is expected that fixed and mobile broadband are substitutes rather than complements, i.e., fixed broadband demand depends negatively on its own-price, whereas demand for fixed-line broadband increases with higher mobile broadband prices. Furthermore, the following relationship between own-price and cross-price elasticities is assumed

\[ |\eta_{ff}| > \eta_{fm} > 0, \]

with \( \eta_{ff} = \frac{\partial q_f}{\partial p_f} \frac{p_f}{q_f} \) and \( \eta_{fm} = \frac{\partial q_f}{\partial p_m} \frac{p_m}{q_f} \), where \( f \) denotes fixed-line broadband and \( m \) mobile broadband. Since it is rather complex to find an accurate standardized
measure for country-level mobile broadband prices because mobile tariffs consist of bundles of voice minutes, texts (SMS), data and so on, mobile tariffs are standardized with the tariff’s uncapped data volume in Gigabit per second (Gbps), i.e., a mobile broadband tariff’s price is measured in US$ PPP/Gbps. To facilitate comparisons, the average of the three cheapest tariffs is calculated per country.

**Tariff diversity**

The recent success of (simple) flat-rate tariffs suggests that simple tariffs may trigger more demand, as they are easily understandable in comparison to more diverse offerings while more complex tariffs may deter consumers from buying. In contrast, classical industrial economics theory suggests that price discrimination in final consumer markets should lead to an expansion of output. The purpose and novelty of this paper is to provide an empirical assessment for how tariff diversity influences broadband demand. As a proxy for a country’s tariff diversity the standard deviation of prices in US$ PPP/Mbps is calculated. Figure 2 shows the price/Mbps ranges in all 34 OECD countries which are related to the newly introduced variable tariff diversity. Thus, we test the classical industrial economic theory that would

![Figure 2: Fixed broadband prices (US$ PPP) per Mbps, September 2011](source: OECD, 2012)
suggest a positive relationship between tariff diversity and fixed broadband demand against the more recently developed behavioral economics view that may suggest a negative relationship.

3.1.2 Explanatory variables

In addition to the three price related variables explained above further explanatory variables are included: First, disposable income which is a key determinant of a person’s decision to purchase goods and services, and, therefore, it is expected to affect broadband demand positively. Income is measured as the gross national income (GNI) per capita in $US PPP. However, we cannot use current income in our regression as one has to cope with possible endogeneity issues, precisely reverse causality. The endogeneity problem arises because increased income probably leads to higher investments in infrastructure and increased consumption for technologies, and this in turn can lead to higher income (cf. Koutroumpis 2009, Gruber & Koutroumpis 2013). Following Gruber & Koutroumpis (2013) we use one year lags of income as a simple way to tackle the effect of reverse causality. The underlying insight is that broadband adoption influences future income after having been adopted, not before. So by using lagged values for GNI we only measure the effect of income on fixed broadband adoption for which we expect a positive impact.

Second, platform competition is expected to foster broadband coverage, since rivalry between technologies is seen as one important determinant promoting broadband adoption. The competitive situation is indicated by a binary dummy variable which equals one if there is competition between DSL technologies and cable in a country, and zero otherwise. Indeed, the data indicates that in countries with competing platforms broadband coverage is on average 12% higher than in countries without platform competition. As a result, inter-modal competition is expected to promote broadband, i.e., to have a positive impact.

In a nutshell, the fixed broadband demand model which we estimate is given by

\[
\log(BP^{fix}_{it}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 p^{fix}_{it} + \beta_2 p^{mob}_{it} + \beta_3 diversity_{it} + \beta_4 income_{it-1} \\
+ \beta_5 comp_{it} + \beta_6 oecd_{it} + \epsilon^d_{it},
\]

where \(i = 1, ..., 91\) indicates each market (or country). \(BP^{fix}_{it}\) indicates broadband penetration, measured as the number of fixed-line broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants in country \(i\) in year \(t = 2012\). \(p^{fix}_{it}\) is the average monthly subscription

\[7\text{Precisely, in high-income countries, i.e., a country with a larger or equal GNI per capita of 30,000 US$ per annum, the penetration rate is nearly 30%, whereas in lower income countries with an annual GNI per capita of around 7,500 US$ the diffusion is only about 10%.}\]
price in US$ PPP per Mbps for a fixed broadband tariff, \( p^\text{mob}_{it} \) is the average mobile broadband monthly subscription price in US$ PPP standardized by the tariff’s data cap. \( \text{diversity}_{it} \) indicates tariff diversity measured by the price variety in country \( i \), \( \text{income}_{it-1} \) is approximated by GNI per capita in US$ PPP and corresponds to 2011, \( \text{comp}_{it} \) is a binary dummy variable that equals one if there is inter-modal competition between xDSL and cable in a country, \( \text{oecd}_{it} \) indicates whether a country is an OECD member state or not, and \( \epsilon^d_{it} \) is the error term.

\[ \text{3.2 Results} \]

\[ \text{3.2.1 Descriptive statistics} \]

Table 1 shows summary statistics for variables used in the analysis. Statistics are given for all countries with fixed-broadband connections faster than 256 Kbps and -as a robustness check of our results- for a subgroup of countries with connections faster than 2 Mbps.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs.</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>≥256 Kbps</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( BP^{fix} )</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>10.73</td>
<td>12.53</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>39.96</td>
<td>ITU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( p^{fix} )</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>154.45</td>
<td>349.02</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>2527.15</td>
<td>Google</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( p^\text{mob} )</td>
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<td>11.89</td>
<td>21.76</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>155.65</td>
<td>Google</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \text{diversity} )</td>
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<td>483.57</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>4085.30</td>
<td>Google</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \text{income} )</td>
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<td>14161</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>59993</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \text{comp} )</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
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<td>0.45</td>
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<td>1.00</td>
<td>OECD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| ≥2 Mbps |      |       |           |      |      |            |
| \( BP^{fix} \) | 81   | 11.23 | 12.16     | 0.00 | 38.61|            |
| \( p^{fix} \) | 81   | 179.56| 271952    | 22.22| 1738.14|           |
| \( p^\text{mob} \) | 75   | 36.36 | 50.95     | 1.99 | 370.06|           |
| \( \text{diversity} \) | 81   | 133.38| 329.78    | 0.00 | 2561.28|           |
| \( \text{income} \) | 81   | 15183 | 14317     | 376  | 59993 |           |
| \( \text{comp} \) | 81   | 0.34  | 0.48      | 0.00 | 1.00 |           |
| \( \text{oecd} \) | 81   | 0.32  | 0.47      | 0.00 | 1.00 |           |

In total 91 countries are included, 26 OECD members and 65 non-member states.

\[ ^8 \text{The selection of independent variables respond to theoretical considerations and data availability, as well as to the need to keep the number of parameters to be estimated low, given the limited number of observations.} \]
The monthly price per Mbps differs substantially between countries: in countries with less wired broadband infrastructure a price/Mbps above 2,500 US$ PPP [150 US$ PPP/Gbps for mobile broadband] is possible, whereas in some high income countries only about 1 US$ PPP [0.5 US$ PPP/Gbps] is paid. The indicator for tariff diversity varies strongly. In some countries prices are very similar, while in other countries there are larger differences in price/Mbps. Moreover, we can infer that in 32% of the countries platform competition between telephone networks and cable is present. In the subsample 81 countries are included. Fixed-line penetration and price are adjusted by subscribers with less than 2 Mbps download speed.

Table 2 shows the correlation between the variables. As expected, in both samples prices are (strongly) negatively correlated with penetration and positively correlated with income, presence of inter-platform competition and OECD membership. All variables are significantly at the 1%-level. Mobile broadband price and tariff diversity are negatively correlated with demand, however not significantly different from zero at all or only at 10%-level, respectively.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>log(BPfix)</th>
<th>pfix</th>
<th>pmob</th>
<th>diversity</th>
<th>income</th>
<th>comp</th>
<th>oecd</th>
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<td>≥256 Kbps</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>-0.182</td>
<td>-0.222</td>
<td>0.629</td>
<td>0.390</td>
<td>1.000</td>
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</table>
3.2.2 Empirical results

Table 3 reports the regression results. Column (1) presents a simple bivariate regression model in which the price level is the only explanatory variable. Column (2) includes all proposed variables. The first two columns state the OLS results. The fixed-line price coefficient has the expected negative sign and is significantly different from zero at the 1% significance level. Increased income and tariff diversity as well as OECD membership positively and significantly enhance demand. Neither the mobile broadband price nor the level of competition are significantly different from zero.

However, in the OLS estimation the price variable is endogenous, since price and penetration are determined simultaneously in equilibrium. Hence, we have to apply instrumental variable techniques to get unbiased estimators. We need to find at least one good instrument which affects supply without affecting demand, thus, we are searching for exogenous supply shifters. Optimal supply shifters are cost factors, however, data on cost is not available. Instead we use a time variable which indicates the interval since the broadband penetration rate in country $i$ exceeds 3% as well as the lagged penetration measured in logarithm. Both variables are expected to influence price but be unrelated to the demand side and thus, assumed to be unrelated to the error term. The time variable is included as a means to reflect differing cost conditions across nations resulting from the network infrastructure roll-out process. To serve at least 3% of the population via fixed broadband an incipient network is needed whose building costs crucially depend on the distance between households which are to be connected. With a low penetration rate a low network coverage is approximated, hence, the initial cost of installing are higher. The previous penetration rate is an adequate instrument under the assumption that in the presence of economies of scale operators set lower prices when they serve more subscribers. However, this effect might diminish if a certain level of penetration is reached and the roll-out in sparsely populated areas is promoted (cf. Calzada & Martínez-Santos 2014).

Table 5 shows the first stage regression results. We test the validity of our instruments using the Hausman test and the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions. Both test confirm the power of our instruments. For all IV regressions we reject the Hausman test's null hypothesis that OLS and 2SLS yield the same estimates, and further, do not reject the Sargan test's null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term.

In Table 3 columns three and four the second stage results of the 2SLS procedure

---

9 All regressions were run using Stata/IC 11.2 for Windows.
### Table 3: Estimation results

Dependent variable: $\log(BP^{fix})$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>OLS (≥256 Kbps)</th>
<th>2SLS (≥2 Mbps)</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>$p^{fix}$</td>
<td>-0.003***</td>
<td>-0.002***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.007){2.18}</td>
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<tr>
<td>$p^{mob}$</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>diversity</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
<td>0.007**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000){1.85}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income</td>
<td>0.084***</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.017){1.24}</td>
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<tr>
<td>comp</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.397){1.11}</td>
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<td>1.368**</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.524){2.28}</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
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<td>-0.449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.249)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
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<td>$R^2$(centered)</td>
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<td>F</td>
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<td>Prob&gt;F</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.122]</td>
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</table>

Significance levels: * : 10%  ** : 5%  *** : 1%.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
P-values are reported in squared brackets.
Variance inflation factors are reported in curly brackets.
are stated. Both price level coefficients have the expected signs. The coefficient of $p^{fix}$ is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. This underlines that countries with lower prices have higher penetration rates. The observed effect of price on broadband demand is considerably larger than the one estimated by OLS. The effect of $p^{mob}$ is, as before, not significant.

The estimated coefficient for tariff diversity is positive and significantly different from zero in each specification at the 5% level\footnote{Including interactions terms of tariff diversity with either OECD membership or time variables to account for different diffusion of broadband does not change the results.}. Its strong and robust positive impact supports the classical hypothesis that price discrimination leads to an expansion of output, as it allows suppliers to serve low-value customers as well as high-value customers with different prices at the same time. Consequently, we can deduce that firms should have an incentive to offer a range of tariffs with different prices to increase broadband adoption.

The analysis also reveals that higher income countries, i.e. OECD states, have a pronounced fixed-line broadband demand. This result is in line with previous findings. Higher income enables consumers to spend more on internet services, and therefore fosters fixed broadband uptake in a country. This finding is confirmed by various other empirical works. Platform competition between telephone technologies and cable is not found to be statistically different from zero. This finding is in line with recent analyses, e.g., Gruber & Koutroumpis (2013).

For a robustness check of the results we conduct the same analysis for a subsample. In the subsample only connections faster than 2 Mbps are regarded as broadband. The 2SLS regression results are stated in the last column of Table 3. Results do not change much. We still observe a negative effect of price and a positive impact of tariff diversity, significant at 1% and 5% level, respectively. Furthermore, income (strongly) increases demand whereas there is no effect on demand by mobile broadband price or inter-modal competition.

4 Discussion and Conclusion

The present paper has determined factors that influence the adoption of broadband internet access and that help to explain the observable patterns of broadband penetration in different countries. In particular, it has been examined how tariff diversity influences broadband uptake which has not been analyzed before.

For the estimation of fixed-line broadband penetration in 91 countries an entirely new data set was used, which includes nearly 1500 fixed-line and more than 2000
mobile broadband tariffs. Based on an instrumental variable approach, which remedies the endogeneity problem that is present in a simple OLS regression, the analysis shows: Firstly, the fixed-line broadband price level crucially matters, it is negatively related to demand in all specifications. Secondly, the newly introduced variable tariff diversity, which measures the standard deviation of tariffs, significantly enhances demand. This results are independent of the level of broadband diffusion. The possibility of price discrimination seems, as suggested by traditional economic theory, to enlarge output and demand by serving consumers with a low willingness-to-pay. Thirdly, higher income and OECD membership positively influence adoption. The positive coefficients indicate that fixed broadband penetration tends to be higher in wealthier economies; again this result is robust. Lastly, the estimated coefficients for mobile broadband price level and inter-platform competition had the expected positive signs, but were insignificant.

These findings indicate that primarily price related factors and socio-economic effects determine fixed broadband penetration. The results also suggest that reduced prices and increased tariff diversity are a more important channel of fixed broadband adoption than increased inter-platform competition. As a policy matter, these results suggest that policy makers should be lenient towards price discrimination in broadband markets.

The estimated model works quite well for a cross-sectional regression of heterogeneous countries with the majority of non OECD countries. The results seem to be true for emerging markets as well as for more mature markets. It is worth pointing out that there are some limitations of this empirical analysis which should be kept in mind. Aggregated data at a national level is used which makes it impossible to account for differences within a country. This is an important aspect that has also been pointed out by other authors in the literature (e.g. Kim et al. 2003, Garcia-Murillo 2005). Further, more detailed data on the level of competition would be desirable, but was unfortunately not available, and finally, broadband adoption, like any process of technology diffusion, is seen as a dynamic development. Such a process of adoption evolves through time and this feature can not be taken into account in a cross-sectional estimation model. Consequently, using time-series data in future research should be eligible.

In conclusion, the results obtained by the model provide some useful first insights and point to the importance of factors that are often overlooked in broadband policy, namely tariff diversity. Given the above-mentioned necessary assumptions and data limitations, further evaluation to confirm the importance of tariff diversity with time-series data should be aspired.
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## Appendix

Table 4: Broadband penetration and prices by country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>fixed broadband user (in %)</th>
<th>internet users (in %)</th>
<th>Price/Mbps (in US$ PPP/Mbps)</th>
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<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>14.00</td>
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<td>4.97</td>
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<td>0.44</td>
<td>14.90</td>
<td>184.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>11.50</td>
<td>218.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>15.70</td>
<td>103.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 5: First stage estimation results 2SLS

Dependent variable: $p_{i,x}$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>256 Kbps (1)</th>
<th>256 Kbps (2)</th>
<th>2 Mbps (1)</th>
<th>2 Mbps (2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\log(BP_{i,x})$</td>
<td>-57.86***</td>
<td>-52.977</td>
<td>-54.429**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(14.491)</td>
<td>(10.89)</td>
<td>(21.898)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3% coverage</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>-1.179</td>
<td>7.577</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.296)</td>
<td>(7.149)</td>
<td>(7.596)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p_{mob}$</td>
<td>0.789</td>
<td>-0.038</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.726)</td>
<td>(0.130)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>diversity</td>
<td>0.439***</td>
<td>0.617***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.159)</td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>comp</td>
<td>-28.466</td>
<td>15.738</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(21.125)</td>
<td>(18.331)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oecd</td>
<td>90.286</td>
<td>-9.65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(8.006)</td>
<td>(14.463)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>195.238***</td>
<td>86.249***</td>
<td>103.856***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(49.432)</td>
<td>(27.976)</td>
<td>(20.483)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>91</th>
<th>85</th>
<th>75</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.196</td>
<td>0.573</td>
<td>0.895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>10.37</td>
<td>9.96</td>
<td>44.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob $&gt;F$</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F (excluded)</td>
<td>10.37</td>
<td>12.04</td>
<td>8.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob $&gt;F$</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance levels: *: 10%  **: 5%  ***: 1%

Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

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