Passenger Fatality Rates
| Mode | Fatality rate per 100 million
hours of exposure |
| Bus/coach | 0.1 |
| Rail | 4.8 |
| Ship | 12.0 |
| Air | 15.0 |
| Car | 15.0 |
| Walking | 20.0 |
| Bicycle | 60.0 |
| Motor cycle | 300.0 |
Reference: H. Collings, Transport Statistics, Great Britain 1994,
(Department of Transport)
Safety Management
The foundation stone of good safety performance is a comprehensive,
formal and systematic regime for managing safety. In 1989/1990, London
Underground adopted the International Safety Rating System (ISRS) as a
proactive safety management tool, with externally verified audits. The
standards achieved to merit the initial ISRS awards have been maintained
across operational areas and extended to other areas of the company. LUL
developed and introduced its own rigorous Safety Management System (SMS)
- based on ISRS to reflect the specific needs of the company. This SMS
is now undergoing an extensive and thorough review and update to ensure
that changes in the operating environment and in legislation are reflected
in the new Safety Directives. Many of the new Directives have been produced
and are being implemented throughout the company.
The essence of good safety management is the identification of risk; the development of worthwhile measures to eliminate, control and reduce the risks; and audit and monitoring to ensure that established systems and new measures are effective. The underlying principle is one of continuous improvement.
Risk Assessment
Over the past few years risk assessment models have been developed
to provide a quantative assessment of major accident risks (this is known
as the LUL QRA).
The QRA model identifies and quantifies the main contributors to the risks to which customers are exposed. Through the use of a specifically developed QRA Risk Management Module, the QRA can be used to carry out "what if" analysis of individual scenarios to assist in the understanding of safety issues and the benefits which may be obtained from safety improvements. This can also assist in the prioritisation of risk reduction measures.
The results of work conducted in 1997/98 showed an approximately 20% reduction in the overall level of risk, compared to that calculated by the QRA at the end of the 1996/97 year. This reduction in risk is largely as a result of more realistic modelling of the platform/train interface, station area accidents and arcing "Top Events" (top events are incidents that pose the highest level of risk). However, the reduction in risk is also attributable to the inclusion of actual changes to the railway.
The QRA model will continue to be developed and updated to reflect actual changes to the railway and improved understanding of the risks.
Reducing Risk
The Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 places an obligation
on all firms to reduce risk to a level which is " as low as reasonably
practicable" (ALARP). No activity can be 100% safe, but London Underground
strives to identify all risks and to eliminate or reduce them wherever
the cost is not grossly disproportionate to the safety benefit. Some of
the steps London Underground is currently taking to tackle risk are:
Asset Health
Much of the Underground was built before the 1914-1918 war, and
there is now a considerable backlog in the replacement of assets which
have reached the end of their useful life. The Monopolies and Mergers Commission
Report on London Underground in 1991 recommended a consistent annual funding
level of £750 million to clear the engineering backlog on the existing
system. Although funding from the Government has not achieved this level,
nevertheless there have been sufficient grants - together with internally
generated funds - to enable progress to be made in renewing life-expired
assets. The recently announce proposals by the Government for a public/private
partnership for LUL will address much of the current underfunding issues
to reduce the backlog of essential works. In the short term, pending replacement
or repair, London Underground is controlling this risk through exceptional
maintenance or inspection regimes, or by restricting use of the asset to
ensure that no undue risk is posed (for example, through speed restrictions
or even by taking it out of service).
Emergency Preparedness
Every operational location on the London Underground has emergency
plans covering all foreseeable emergencies such as fire, overcrowding and
third party actions. Staff have regular evacuation drills, and there are
also procedures for the rapid shutdown and evacuation of individual Underground
lines and even of the entire system should it prove necessary. Regular
joint exercises are held with the emergency services and with other organisations,
such as Railtrack, to test and refine these procedures.
Learning from experience
As part of its SMS, LUL has a comprehensive incident reporting system.
All serious incidents are investigated to identify root causes, and recommendations
are made to help prevent any recurrence. Including near misses, there are
about 55 000 events reported each year, of which approximately 8 000 are
health, safety or environment related.
Major incidents may also lead to a formal investigation by Her Majesty's Railway Inspectorate (HMRI) which is the arm of the Health and Safety Executive responsible for regulating safety on railways. In the case of the King's Cross fire in November 1987 (in which 31 people died), the Government ordered a judicial inquiry led by Sir Desmond Fennell QC. The Fennell Report made 157 recommendations, of which 126 applied to London Transport. The 126 recommendations involved 158 separate actions, of which 147 are complete. The remaining actions involve long-term activities, such as escalator replacement across the system, on which steady progress is being made.
Key actions which London Underground has implemented include: staff selection, training and deployment; emergency preparedness; communications; safety auditing; and the need for proactive safety management. The King's Cross fire also led to the Fire Precautions (Sub-Surface Railway Stations) Regulations 1989, (usually refered to as Section 12 Regulations). These apply to the 112 below ground stations on the network and cover fire detection and suppression; fire alarms; the installation of compartments to prevent fire spread; evacuation procedures; staff training; and the use of fire-resistant materials. Compliance with the Regulations is confirmed by regular half-yearly inspections of each station by the London Fire and Civil Defence Authority and by safety audits. All 112 stations are either fully compliant with the Regulations, or exceed the requirements.
The number of confirmed fires, the majority of which are on the track, is shown in the table below:
Confirmed fire reports
| Year | Stations
(excluding escalators) |
Escalators | Other,
(including track) |
Total |
| 1991/2 | 70 | 82 | 882 | 1 034 |
| 1992/3 | 53 | 30 | 569 | 652 |
| 1993/4 | 49 | 11 | 347 | 407 |
| 1994/5 | 33 | 3 | 284 | 320 |
| 1995/6 | 28 | 3 | 480 | 511 |
| 1996/97 | 28 | 5 | 443 | 476 |
| 1997/98 | 26 | 4 | 366 | 396 |
London Underground also learns from accidents on other systems, for example it has implemented the relevant recommendations from the report by Sir Anthony Hidden QC into the British Rail accident near Clapham Junction. It should however be noted that London Underground uses automatic train protection (ATP) which would make that type of accident extremely unlikely on its system. LUL also reviews investigation reports into railway accidents worldwide to ensure that any relevant lessons learnt from the causes are implemented.
Effort is also invested in the proactive search for problems before they cause accidents/incidents, by use of structured audit programmes. Regular safety audits are conducted to ensure compliance with London Underground's Safety Case, the SMS and local procedures. General inspections, safety tours and surveys are conducted by managers to assist in the identification of hazards and to raise safety awareness.
Occupational Safety
The health and safety of staff is a key concern. The
Underground has an established network of health and safety representatives
who work with managers and their colleagues to identify potential hazards,
and to find ways of reducing or eliminating them. Lost time injuries to
staff average about 3.5 per 100 employees per year, and the dominant causes
are assaults (30%) and slips, trips and falls (25%).
Safety Case
The privatisation of the national railway system has
led to the introduction of the Railway Safety Case Regulations. Safety
Cases were originally developed in the chemical, nuclear and off-shore
oil industries, and involve a clear and auditable statement of the way
in which risks are identified and managed to a level as low as is reasonably
practicable. Ongoing changes of significance must be demonstrably safe.
London Underground has a Safety Case which has been accepted by HMRI, who
considered it to be a leader in its class, and by Railtrack for services
operated over its infrastructure. LUL’s Safety Case will have been in operation
for 3 years in February 1999. The regulations call for a thorough review
of the safety case at this time. LUL has nearly completed this review and,
so far, no significant weaknesses have been identified.